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“A more interesting approach would be to tie liquidity and capital standards together by
requiring higher levels of capital for large firms unless their liquidity position is substantially
stronger than minimum requirements. This approach would reflect the fact that the market
perception of a given firm’s position as counterparty depends upon the combination of its
funding position and capital levels. [...] While there is decidedly a need for solid minimum
requirements for both capital and liquidity, the relationship between the two also matters.
Where a firm has little need of short-term funding to maintain its ongoing business, it is
less susceptible to runs. Where, on the other hand, a firm is significantly dependent on such
funding, it may need considerable common equity capital to convince market actors that it is
indeed solvent. Similarly, the greater or lesser use of short-term funding helps define a firm’s
relative contribution to the systemic risk latent in these markets.” - Remarks by Daniel K.
Tarullo, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Peterson Institute
for International Economics, May 3, 2013.
1 Introduction
The main function of banks is to provide liquidity by offering funding (deposits) that is
more liquid than their asset holdings (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). This liquidity mis-
match, part of their business model, makes banks vulnerable to runs as creditors can de-
mand immediate repayment when the bank faces asset shocks. The rationale for studying
the solvency-liquidity nexus of banks is based on the literature explaining bank runs based
on the strength of the bank’s fundamentals. In Allen and Gale (1998), banking panics are
related to the business cycle where creditors run if they anticipate that the bank’s asset val-
ues will deteriorate. Similarly, Gorton (1988) shows that bank runs are systematic responses
to the perceived risk of banks.
Theoretical models on the two-way interaction between solvency and liquidity have been
more recently developed. Diamond and Rajan (2005) show that bank runs, by making banks
insolvent, exacerbate aggregate liquidity shortages. In Rochet and Vives (2004), there is an
intermediate range of the bank assets value for which the bank is still solvent but can fail if
too many of its creditors withdraw, and the range of the interval decreases with the strength
of the bank’s fundamentals. Then, Morris and Shin (2008) explain that bank runs come
from both the bank’s weak fundamentals and the “jitteriness” of its creditors. Therefore, the
failure region of the bank would be smaller if both the bank and its creditors held more cash.
An implication of this literature is that systemic risk is likely to play a key role in the
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solvency-liquidity nexus through the liquidation costs caused by fire sales in a crisis. If the
firm fails in isolation, its illiquid assets can be liquidated for a price close to their value in
best use (Shleifer and Vishny (1992)).1 In a systemic crisis, however, potential buyers will be
unable to find funding to buy the assets of the distressed firm. Creditors will consequently
run from banks that are vulnerable to an aggregate shock as they anticipate these banks will
not be able to repay them in a crisis.
While the solvency-liquidity nexus has been well studied theoretically in the economic
literature, the interaction between solvency and liquidity risks tends to be omitted in the
new capital and liquidity regulatory standards. The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) of Basel
III imposes that financial firms hold a sufficient amount of high-quality liquid assets to cover
their liquidity needs over a month of stressed liquidity scenario.2 However, the liquidity
needs according to this standard are essentially a function of the funding mix of the bank
and do not depend on other bank’s fundamentals, in particular, on its capital adequacy and
asset risks. Similarly, the required capitalization of a bank in Basel III is not related to its
exposure to funding liquidity risk.3
The solvency-liquidity nexus of banks has also not been the center of empirical studies
investigating funding liquidity risk of the financial sector.4 In this paper, I fill this gap in
the literature and test whether the solvency-liquidity nexus of banks empirically holds by
examining the short-term balance sheet of 50 U.S. bank holding companies over 2000-2013.
1Other fire-sale papers also relying on the Shleifer and Vishny (1992) insight include Allen and Gale
(1998, 2000a,b, 2004); Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008); Acharya and Viswanathan (2011); Diamond and
Rajan (2005, 2011).
2Next to the LCR, Basel III also introduces a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The NSFR is the ratio
of available stable funding to required stable funding over a one year horizon. The required stable funding is
determined based the institution’s assets and activities (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011)).
3Funding liquidity risk is only likely to play a modest role via the interconnectedness measure used
to derive the additional capital requirement for globally systemically important financial institutions (G-
SIFIs). The systemic importance measure is the equally-weighted average of the size, interconnectedness,
lack of substitutes for the institution’s services, global activity and complexity (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2013b)). Interconnectedness is itself based on three indicator measures: intra-financial system
assets, intra-financial system liabilities, and securities outstanding. Alternatively, some supervisory stress
test models explicitly feature funding liquidity feedbacks from the deterioration of the banks’ fundamentals
as in the risk assessment model for systemic institutions (RAMSI) of Aikman et al. (2009) used at the Bank
of England.
4Related empirical studies include Das and Sy (2012) who document the trade-off between solvency and
liquidity; banks with more stable funding and more liquid assets do not need as much capital to get the
same stock return. Gorton and Metrick (2012) find that increases in repo rates are correlated to higher
aggregate counterparty risk, whereas increases in repo haircuts are correlated to higher uncertainty about
collateral values. Afonso et al. (2011) study the Fed funds market and find increased sensitivity to bank-
specific counterparty risk during times of crisis (both in the amounts lent to borrowers and in the cost of
overnight funds).
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Short-term debt mainly consists of Fed funds purchased and repurchase agreements (repos),
uninsured deposits and other short-term borrowings. Short-term assets include cash, Fed
funds sold and reverse repos, and short-term debt securities.
The difference between short-term debt and short-term assets is used in this paper as a
proxy for the exposure of a firm to funding liquidity risk. Funding liquidity risk arises when a
financial firm cannot roll-over its existing short-term debt and/or raise new short-term debt.
When the bank’s short-term funding starts drying up, the firm needs a sufficient amount
of liquid assets that can be converted into cash to repay creditors. The gap between its
short-term debt and short-term assets — the liquid asset shortfall — represents the amount
of liquid assets that would be left if the bank lost its complete access to short-term funding
(see Figure 1 for a simplified view of the balance sheet of a bank).
I test for the solvency-liquidity nexus using a fixed-effects panel vector autoregressive
(VAR) model. In particular, I test for the interaction between solvency and liquidity using
several measures of solvency risk: regulatory capital ratios, market measures of risk (realized
volatility, market beta), and a measure of the expected capital shortfall (SRISK) of the
bank under aggregate stress defined by Acharya et al. (2010, 2012) and Brownlees and Engle
(2011). According to SRISK, a firm is adequately capitalized to survive a crisis if its
ratio of market capitalization to total assets remains larger than 8% when the market index
falls by 40% over the next six months. This measure is an alternative to the capital shortfall
estimates of stress tests that is purely based on publicly available market data (and therefore
available at a higher frequency than stress tests outcomes).
I document four important results. First, I find that the bank’s capital shortfall under
stress (SRISK) determines how much short-term debt it can raise. This result supports
the models of Allen and Gale (1998); Diamond and Rajan (2005), etc. explaining bank runs
based on the strength of the bank’s fundamentals. Conversely, the expected capital shortfall
of a bank increases when the bank holds more short-term debt (has a larger exposure to
funding liquidity risk), in line with the introductory quote of D. Tarullo and some previ-
ous evidence that firms with more maturity mismatch have a larger contribution to systemic
risk (Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010)). Figure 2 illustrates well the solvency-liquidity nexus
where capital-constrained banks (i.e. banks with a positive SRISK) had a larger average ex-
posure to liquidity risk (measured by the difference between short-term debt and short-term
assets) than adequately capitalized banks before the financial crisis. The average liquidity
shortfall of capital-constrained banks reached a maximum of $133 billion in the third quarter
of 2007. This exposure made them particularly vulnerable to the sudden freeze of short-term
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funding markets that followed.
Second, I show that not all solvency risk measures predict the short-term debt level of
banks. The expected capital shortfall SRISK interacts well with the level of short-term
funding of the bank compared to other measures of solvency risk because (i) it is a measure
of the bank’s exposure to aggregate risk, and (ii) it combines both book and market values.
Relating to the model of liquidation costs of Shleifer and Vishny (1992), result (i) suggests
that a bank with higher solvency risk in isolation does not necessarily get restricted access
to short-term funding. What matters most for the suppliers of short-term funding is the
vulnerability of the bank to an aggregate crisis. When this crisis occurs, result (ii) suggests
that ’pure’ solvency risk (measured by the Tier 1 leverage ratio), amplified by market shocks,
explains the bank’s access to short-term funding.
Third, the stressed solvency risk measure interacts with the bank’s profitability (measured
by its net income divided by total assets) in determining its short-term balance sheet. While
a more profitable bank has a larger access to short-term funding and does not hold as much
liquid assets, profitability does not have this beneficial effect on its short-term balance sheet
when the bank is expected to be capital-constrained in a crisis. For example, the positive
net income of $2 billion of Citigroup in the third quarter of 2007 did not prevent the bank
from losing 18% of its short-term funding (-$172 billion) the next quarter, as Citigroup
was also highly undercapitalized according to SRISK ($51 billion expected capital shortfall
in 2007Q3). Using impulse response functions, I show how the solvency-liquidity nexus is
exacerbated when a bank is expected to be insolvent in a crisis. Therefore, maintaining
a certain level of capitalization of the banking sector reduces systemic risk not only by
addressing solvency risk problems of banks in a crisis; it also attenuates the solvency-liquidity
nexus that makes banks particularly vulnerable to an aggregate crisis.
Finally, the solvency-liquidity nexus appears to be strong under many robustness checks
(controlling for government interventions and common factors). Furthermore, out-of-sample
forecasting results during the European sovereign debt crisis show that the solvency-liquidity
interaction helps improve the forecasts of the short-term balance sheet of banks. Omitting
SRISK in the model increases the forecasting errors of the liquid asset shortfall considerably,
and particularly for capital-constrained banks.
Overall, the results of this paper suggest that the solvency-liquidity nexus should be
accounted for when designing liquidity and capital requirements, in contrast to Basel III reg-
ulation where liquidity and solvency risks are treated separately. The paper gives empirical
support to the approach advanced by Tarullo (2013) to tie liquidity and capital requirements
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together by requiring banks with a large exposure to short-term funding to hold an addi-
tional capital buffer. The liquid asset buffer of the LCR might be a sufficient requirement
from a microprudential perspective. However, the sudden drop in short-term funding for
a bank that has a perfectly maturity-matched securities book (including repos and reverse
repos) may also result in fire sales and increases the risk of contagion by transferring funding
liquidity risk to the bank’s customers. The supplementary capital buffer is a preemptive
measure that would give the confidence to creditors to continue to provide funding to the
bank in a period of aggregate stress.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I describe the short-term
balance sheet of banks and their solvency risk measures. I test the solvency-liquidity nexus
in Section 3. I comment on the out-of-sample forecasting results in Section 4.
2 Short-term balance sheet and solvency risk measures
2.1 Long-term vs. short-term balance sheet and the liquid asset
shortfall
The sample considered in this paper is a panel of 49 publicly traded U.S. bank holding
companies (BHC) reporting their regulatory accounting data over 13 years from 2000Q1 until
2013Q1 (i.e., 53 quarters). This sample of banks corresponds to the intersection between
the NYU Volatility Laboratory (V-Lab) sample for its global systemic risk analysis (that
will be introduced in the next section) and the bank holding companies reporting under the
FR Y-9C schedule (equivalent to the Call Reports of Condition and Income of commercial
banks). The names of the BHCs and their market capitalizations are reported in Appendix
D.
I construct the short-term debt and short-term asset variables of these BHCs based on
items extracted from their FR Y-9C reports from the SNL Financial database. The short-
term debt is constituted of uninsured time deposits of remaining maturity of less than a year,
securities sold under agreements to repurchase (repos), Federal funds purchased, and other
borrowed money of remaining maturity of less than a year. The short-term assets include
debt securities of remaining maturity of less than a year, interest-bearing bank balances
(cash), securities purchased under agreements to resell (reverse repos), and Federal funds
sold. The components of short-term debt and short-term assets are described and illustrated
in Appendix A.
As the panel data set is unbalanced, I will restrict the following analyses to a smaller
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sample of 44 banks for which the time series dimension is larger than 30 observations.5 I
test the stationarity of the balance sheet quantities (in logarithms) in Appendix B, using
the panel unit root test robust to cross-sectional dependence of Pesaran (2007). This test
indicates that the permanent impact of a shock on the size (measured by total assets) of
a bank comes from shocks in the long-term balance sheet (where the unit root hypothesis
is not rejected), whereas the short-term balance sheet shocks revert to a trend level.6 This
result is consistent with the long-term balance sheet being the core business of the traditional
bank that invests insured deposits (part of the long-term debt) in loans (long-term assets).7
The evolution of the average balance sheet of banks is shown in Figure 3. The average
size of the balance sheet (total assets) triples (from $85 billion to $280 billion) over the
sample period and follows an increasing trend in the long-term balance sheet. Over this
period, and particularly during the financial crisis, salient events include the acquisition of
out-of-sample banks by in-sample banks; Golden West Financial sold to Wachovia in May
2006, Bear Stearns sold to J.P.Morgan in March 2008, Countrywide to Bank of America
in July 2008, Washington Mutual to J.P.Morgan and Merrill Lynch to Bank of America in
September 2008, and the acquisition of in-sample banks by other in-sample banks; National
City Corp. sold to PNC and Wachovia to Wells Fargo in the last quarter of 2008.
For the purpose of testing the solvency-liquidity nexus, this paper focuses on the short-
term part of the balance sheet. The acquisition of two major investment banks (Bear Stearns
and Merrill Lynch) in 2008 brought a considerable amount of short-term debt and short-
term assets in the banking sector. The increase in the average short-term balance sheet is
considerable with the purchase of Bear Stearns (visible on J.P.Morgan’s balance sheet in
2008Q3). In comparison, the impact of the acquisition of Merrill Lynch (visible on Bank of
America’s balance sheet in 2009Q1) on the average short-term balance sheet is attenuated
as several large banks were losing a significant amount of short-term funding at that time.
In contrast to an overall increasing trend in short-term assets, the average short-term
debt slowed down in 2007Q3 with the first signs of a “run on repo” in August 2007 (Gorton
and Metrick (2012)), visible on the short-term balance sheet of several large banks including
Citigroup that lost $172 billion (18%) of short-term debt from 2007Q3 to 2007Q4. The
average short-term debt reached a peak in the third quarter of 2008 (with the acquisition of
5This restriction excludes Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley from the sample as they obtained the
status of bank holding company at the end of 2008.
6The trend stationarity of the short-term balance sheet allows estimating a dynamic panel data model
directly on the levels in Section 3, by applying standard estimation and inference techniques.
7The long-term debt (resp. assets) is the difference between total liabilities (resp. assets) and short-term
debt (resp. assets).
6
Bear Stearns), and declined afterwards.
The gap between the short-term debt and short-term assets of a bank — its liquid asset
shortfall — represents the amount of liquid assets that would be left if the bank lost its
complete access to short-term funding.8 The average liquid asset shortfall of the banking
sector (also shown in Figure 3) was the widest at the end of 2007, making banks particularly
vulnerable to the sudden freeze in short-term funding markets. The short-term funding
freeze was further accentuated with credit risk concerns at the end of 2008 with Lehman
Brothers’ bankruptcy and the most negative average net income of banks over the sample
period ($-850 million).
Since the financial crisis, the average liquid asset shortfall of banks has been declining
to become negative in 2011 (i.e., banks now hold more short-term assets than short-term
debt). Several circumstances explain the increase of banks’ stock of short-term assets. A
first explanation is linked to the persistent effect of the financial crisis on the real economy
where the demand for loans has been slowly recovering and outpaced by deposit growth. As
a result, banks have been investing in securities and (profitable) treasury products.9 In order
to obtain secured short-term funding, banks also need to hold more short-term liquid assets
than before due to stricter collateral requirements (higher haircuts). Then, higher liquid
asset holdings by banks respond to precautionary concerns by banks (protecting against
anticipated interest rate increase) and the regulator. Banks are encouraged by regulation
to hold more short-term liquid assets to comply with both liquidity requirements (Basel
III liquidity coverage ratio) and capital requirements (as holding short-term assets usually
involves low regulatory capital requirements).
2.2 Solvency risk measures
2.2.1 Regulatory capital ratios
The regulator usually employs capital ratios to assess the solvency risk of a bank. Figure
4 displays the average regulatory capital ratios: the Tier 1 common capital ratio (T1CR)
8Also note that short-term assets will serve in this paper as a proxy for liquid assets due to the lack of
historical data for the assets included in the high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) definition of Basel III. High
quality liquid assets include cash, reserves at central banks, treasury bonds, and non-financial corporate
bonds and covered bonds with the highest ratings. Additional assets like highly-rated RMBS, non-financial
corporate bonds and covered bonds with [A+, BBB-] rating, and common equity shares can be included in
the HQLA stock with the appropriate haircuts specified in the LCR revision of 2013 (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2013a)).
9“US banks brace for interest rate rises”, Financial Times, February 24, 2011. “Excess deposits demand
novel responses”, Financial Times, May 30, 2012.
7
and the Tier 1 leverage ratio (T1LV GR). The Tier 1 common capital ratio is the ratio
of Tier 1 common equity capital to risk-weighted assets, whereas the Tier 1 leverage ratio
is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets. The upward shift in regulatory capital ratios
in the fourth quarter of 2008 indicates a healthier banking system, and coincides with the
launch on October 14, 2008 of the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and the Temporary
Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) under the Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP). By
purchasing assets and equity from troubled banks from October 2008 on, the TARP led to
a significant increase in the average capital ratios. For example, Treasury bought $25 billion
of preferred shares of Citigroup in October 2008 and another $20 billion in November 2008
under the CPP.10
2.2.2 Expected capital shortfalls in a crisis
Acharya et al. (2012) define the systemic risk contribution of a firm i to the real economy
at time t as “the real social costs of a crisis per dollar of capital shortage(t)× Probability
of a crisis(t) × SRISKit”, where SRISKit represents the expected capital shortfall of the
firm in a crisis, i.e. when the market equity index drops by 40% over the next six months.
In these market conditions, SRISK is based on the assumption that the book value of the
(long-term) debt Dit of the bank will remain constant over the six-month horizon while its
market capitalization MVit will decrease by its six-month return in a crisis, called the long-
run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES). The expected capital shortfall in a crisis of bank
i at time t is defined by
SRISKit = Et[k(Dit+h +MVit+h)−MVit+h|Rmt+h ≤ −40%] (1)
= kDit − (1− k) ∗MVit ∗ (1− LRMESit)
where Rmt+h is the return of the market index from period t to period t + h (h = 6
months), k is the prudential capital ratio (8% for U.S. financial firms), and LRMESit =
−Et(Rit+h|Rmt+h ≤ −40%). Compared to other market-based measures of systemic risk like
the CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) or the Distress Insurance Premium (DIP)
of Huang et al. (2012), an interesting feature of SRISK is that it is a function of size and
leverage which are two characteristics that the regulator finds particularly relevant when
measuring solvency risk of banks. SRISK can be written as a function of size, leverage and
risk
SRISKit = MVit {k(Lvgit − 1)− (1− k)(1− LRMESit)} (2)
10See http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/TARP-Tracker.aspx.
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where Lvgit is the quasi-market leverage defined as the ratio of quasi-market assets to market
capitalization (Lvgit = (MVit + Dit)/MVit). Therefore, the capital shortfall of a bank will
be large if the bank is large, highly leveraged, and highly sensitive to an aggregate shock as
measured by LRMESit.
These measures (SRISK and LRMES) are available from the V-Lab website developed
at NYU Stern School of Business.11 In the global systemic risk analysis of V-Lab, LRMES
is extrapolated from its short-term counterpart MES, which represents the daily return of
the bank conditional on a 2% decline in the daily return of a global market index. The MES
is derived from a time-varying beta estimated with the Dynamic Conditional Beta model of
Engle (2012) that accounts for asynchronous trading around the world when measuring the
comovement of bank returns with a global market index.
By definition, SRISK can be negative when a bank is expected to have a capital excess
in a crisis. In Figure 4, we find two different regimes for the average SRISK of banks. Banks
were in excess of capital in average (negative SRISK) before 2007. The average SRISK
was the lowest in the third quarter of 2006, then started to increase in 2007. SRISK became
positive in the fourth quarter of 2007 and reached a maximum average capital shortfall of
$16 billion in the first quarter of 2009. The average capital shortfall has remained positive
since the financial crisis (reflecting a low market-to-book ratio) and bumped several times
afterwards, in particular in the heat of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011.
3 Testing the solvency-liquidity nexus of banks
As liquidity risk concerns both sides of the balance sheet, I test for the interaction be-
tween solvency risk, short-term debt, and short-term assets. Panel unit root tests indicate
that the variables yit = ln(STDebtit), zit = ln(STAssetsit), and the solvency risk measure
SRISKit/TAit are trend stationary (see Appendix B). Therefore, the solvency-liquidity
nexus is tested using a fixed-effects panel vector autoregressive (VAR) model for the (K×1)
vector of endogenous variables wit
wit = αi + Φwit−1 + θt+ εit, t = 1, 2, ..., Ti, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (3)
where αi are bank dummies, θ is a trend parameter and Φ is a (K × K) matrix of VAR
parameters.12 Based on in-sample fit criteria, I augment the panel VAR process of eq. (3)
11See http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/.
12The parameters of eq. (3) are estimated by ordinary least squares. The bias of OLS parameter estimates
is likely to be small for the considered sample since the minimum size of the time series dimension for each
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to allow for heterogenous trend and heterogenous dynamic parameters
wit = αi + φi  wit−1 + θit+ δwit−1 + εit, (4)
where φi, θi are (K × 1) vectors of parameters specific to bank i, δ is a (K × K) matrix
of parameters with zeros on the diagonal, and  is the Hadamard product. Bank-specific
parameters mainly reflect different business models and the resulting differences in aversion
for funding liquidity risk.
The estimates of the interaction parameters (δ) of equation (4) are reported in Table
1, where wit = (yit, zit, SRISKit/TAit)′. This Table reveals the empirical solvency-liquidity
nexus where banks with a larger expected capital shortfall hold less short-term debt in the
next quarter; the estimates suggest that a positive unit shock on the ratio of SRISK to
total assets produces a -1.102% shock on the short-term funding of the bank. On the other
leg of the interaction, a 1% increase in the short-term debt of the bank increases its capital
shortfall ratio by 0.009. Therefore, the interaction between solvency and short-term debt is
asymmetric; higher solvency risk limits the access of the firm to short-term funding but a
firm with more short-term debt has a higher risk of insolvency in a crisis.
This result supports the theoretical literature explaining bank runs based on the strength
of the banks fundamentals (Allen and Gale (1998); Diamond and Rajan (2005), etc.), and
describing the interaction between liquidity and solvency problems of banks (Diamond and
Rajan (2005); Morris and Shin (2008); Rochet and Vives (2004)). The results also give
empirical support to the recent speeches by Carney (2013) and Tarullo (2013) explaining
that the repair of banks’ balance sheet (i.e. higher capital levels) gives the confidence to
investors and creditors to continue to provide funding to banks.
From Table 1, we also note that short-term assets do not relate to the other variables
in the vector wit, suggesting that banks are not able to adjust their stock of short-term
assets to solvency risk or short-term funding conditions in a timely fashion. It also reflects
a liquidity hoarding tendency of banks where banks prefer to sell long-term assets to repay
short-term creditors. Banks prefer to hold the short-term assets for precautionary reasons
or for investing in fire sale assets of other financial institutions that are expected to generate
high future returns (Acharya et al. (2009)). Evidence of liquidity hoarding where banks with
more short-term debt sell long-term assets rather than short-term assets is shown in Table 2.
The Table reports the estimation results of the panel VAR model above where the vector wit
also includes the long-term balance sheet. The Table also shows that the expected capital
bank is 30 observations (i.e. Ti ≥ 30, ∀i).
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shortfall SRISK is only related to the short-term part of the balance sheet and does not
predict long-term leverage.
In the rest of this section, I test alternative solvency risk measures to predict the short-
term balance sheet of banks in Section 3.1, for the interaction between profitability and
solvency risk in predicting the short-term balance sheet (Section 3.2), and for the robustness
of the solvency-liquidity nexus in Section 3.3.
3.1 Testing alternative solvency risk measures
I report the tests of alternative measures of solvency risk to predict the short-term balance
sheet (yit and zit) in Table 3, controlling for the market-to-book ratio as the regression
includes both accounting and market variables. The columns (1) to (5) show the individual
impact of each measure. From this Table, the regulatory capital ratios (T1CR and T1LV GR)
do not appear to be related to either side of the short-term balance sheet. Market measures
of risk like the realized quarterly volatility is significant (at 5%) to predict short-term assets
but this result does not hold in the regression including all solvency risk factors (column (6)).
Then, the sensitivity of the bank’s return to market shocks measured by the the Dynamic
Conditional Beta (DCB) of Engle (2012), and the contribution of the bank to systemic risk
measured by the Delta CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) are not significant drivers
of the short-term balance sheet either. When all solvency risk factors are included in the
regression (column (6)), only SRISK per unit of asset and the market-to-book ratio are
significant at the 1% level to predict the short-term debt level of banks.
The results of Table 3 suggest that not all solvency risk factors can predict the shocks in
the short-term balance sheet of banks. A bank with higher solvency risk in isolation does
not necessarily get restricted access to short-term funding. However, banks lose short-term
funding when they are expected to be insolvent in a systemic crisis. An explanation for this
observation is based on the liquidation costs of a firm’s illiquid assets in a crisis. Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) show that when a firm is individually in distress, its liquidation costs are not
as high because the firm can find buyers in the same industry who value its illiquid assets
at a price close to their value in best use. In a crisis, however, the potential buyers in the
industry will likely also meet difficulties to find funding and will not be able to buy those
assets. The firm will then have to sell its illiquid assets to less specialized buyers outside the
industry at a higher liquidation cost.
A bank that is expected to be insolvent in a crisis will be facing high liquidation costs and
will consequently not be able to raise cash. Creditors who anticipate this based on publicly
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available data (as those used to derive SRISK) will run from the bank as they expect the
bank will not be able to repay them. The liquidation costs during the 2008 financial crisis
were exacerbated by the huge gap between short-term assets and short-term debt observed
in Section 2. As a result, banks had no choice but to sell illiquid assets to repay creditors
when losing access to short-term funding.
In-sample fit criteria show the superiority of SRISK in Table 4 (first column) to predict
short-term funding; the adjusted R2 is 15.7% compared to an adjusted R2 around 11% for
the regressions with the alternative solvency risk measures of Table 3.13 In order to identify
what works so well in SRISK to predict the short-term funding of banks, Table 4 also
reports the estimates of the different components of SRISK highlighted in eq. (2). The
Table shows that the improvement in in-sample fit rather comes from the ratio of market
capitalization to total assets (MV/TA) than from the long-run marginal expected shortfall
(LRMES) or the quasi-market leverage (Lvg). The main difference between Lvg and the
ratioMV/TA is a different combination of book and market values; the ratioMV/TA is the
product of the book leverage ratio (T1LV GRit) and the market-to-book ratio (MVit/BVit)
MVit
TAit
=
BVit ∗
(
MVit
BVit
)
TAit
' T1LV GRit ∗
(
MVit
BVit
)
,
whereas Lvgit = 1 + DitMVit is not a function of the book leverage ratio. Market values are
expected to reflect liquidity problems of banks as they incorporate information about both
solvency and liquidity risks. Therefore, any measure based on market values is not a “pure”
solvency risk measure. The results of Table 4 however suggest that both the book leverage
ratio — informing about “pure” solvency risk — and the market-to-book ratio — informing
about how fast the market values fall compared to book values — are important factors ex-
plaining banks’ access to short-term funding. The ratio MV/TA is highly correlated to the
book leverage ratio (0.91) and less correlated to the market-to-book ratio (0.44); solvency
risk, amplified by market shocks, explains banks’ access to short-term funding, and nei-
ther the market-to-book or the leverage ratio taken separately, nor their linear combination
predict short-term funding.
The modest improvement in fit due to the downside risk of the bank in a crisis LRMES
(0.66% increase of adjusted R2 from column 4 to column 5, Table 4) is consistent with the
sample period that contains several episodes of market stress. In a crisis, all is already
13Note that all reported R2 are on the first differences (wit −wit−1). The R2 of levels (wit) are very high
(around 90%) given the bank specific constant, trend and autoregressive parameters.
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function of the aggregate shock. However, measuring the downside risk is important pre-
emptively; I find increasing out-of-sample forecasting errors when MV/TA is employed in
the panel VAR instead of SRISK/TA for predicting the short-term balance sheet of banks
during the European sovereign debt crisis (especially with the dynamic forecasting exercise
of Section 4).
3.2 Interaction between solvency and profitability
In Perotti and Suarez (2011), both liquidity risk and profitability are increasing functions
of the short-term debt level of the bank. A bank will indeed demand more short-term
funding when it finds profitable investment opportunities. Its liquidity risk will also increase
as its short-term debt will be invested in long-term profitable assets. The impact of the
profitability of the bank measured by its net income divided by total assets is found to be
positive on short-term debt and negative on short-term assets in Table 5 (Panel A), but
these parameters are not significant at the 5% level.
The parameters of eq. (4) are however expected to vary with the state of the bank and/or
the aggregate liquidity conditions. In good times, short-term funding and short-term assets
are the result of management decisions and are driven by demand factors. As mentioned,
banks with profitable opportunities will demand more short-term funding. In bad times,
supply factors determine how much short-term debt a bank can raise and the short-term
assets adjust accordingly. One way to disentangle supply and demand effects on the bank
characteristics is to augment equation (4) with a state variable
wit = αi + φi  wit−1 + θit+ δwit−1 + γwit−1 ∗ st−1 + ωst−1 + εit (5)
where ω is a (K × 1) vector of parameters, γ is a (K ×K) matrix of parameters with zeros
on the diagonal, and the state variable st could be a bank characteristic or a common factor.
For example, Cornett et al. (2011) use the TED spread (the difference between 3-month
LIBOR rate and the T-bill rate) to reflect the change in the management of liquidity risk
exposures of banks during the financial crisis.14 In Table 5 (Panel B), I show that a good
candidate for the state variable is simply a dummy variable equal to one when SRISK is
positive (sit = 1{SRISKit>0}), i.e. when the bank is expected to have a capital shortfall in a
crisis.
This distinction between states where SRISK is positive or negative appears to be
14The TED spread is however not significant to predict the short-term balance sheet for the sample
considered in this paper (cf.. Section 3.3.2).
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important when measuring the effect of the profitability of the bank on its short-term balance
sheet. Indeed, a bank with a higher net income has a larger access to short-term funding
while it does not hold as much liquid assets. In Table 5, this beneficial effect of the bank’s
profitability on its short-term balance sheet appears to be true only when the bank’ SRISK
is negative, i.e. when the bank is adequately capitalized to survive a crisis (sit = 0). When
the bank is expected to be capital-constrained in a crisis (sit = 1), the effect of profitability
on its balance sheet disappears (δ + γ ' 0), and only supply factors (solvency risk) predict
the short-term debt of the bank.
An interesting observation is that the contrasting impact of profitability on the short-
term balance sheet can be reproduced when I allow for breaks in the interaction parameters
δ over time
wit = αi + φi  wit−1 + θit+ δwit−1 + δcwit−1 ∗ ct + δpcwit−1 ∗ pct + ωcct + ωpcpct + εit (6)
where ct and pct are dummy variables indicating whether the quarter t belongs to the financial
crisis period (2007Q1-2009Q4) or the post crisis period (2010Q1-2013Q1) respectively. In
Table 11 (Appendix C), we observe that the impact of the net income on the short-term
balance sheet also disappeared during the financial crisis (δ + δc ' 0). This Table further
shows that SRISK parameter was significant only during the financial crisis (when there
was actual liquidity stress). The results tend to confirm the interpretation of SRISK as a
supply factor for short-term funding, and of the net income as a demand factor when the
firm is adequately capitalized.
Based on the estimates of the panel VAR, I construct the impulse response functions
(IRF) of wit where wit = (yit, zit, NetIncomeit/TAit, SRISKit/TAit)′. I collect the orthogo-
nalized shocks of the VAR from a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of εit of
eq. (4), with the ordering given by [NetIncomeit/TAit → SRISKit/TAit → yit → zit]. This
ordering is motivated by the observation that exogenous shocks first impact a firm via its
activities and is translated into the net income, markets react by adjusting their assessment
of the capital shortfall SRISK, this in turn affects how much funding the bank can access,
and the short-term assets adjust in consequence.
Due to the heterogenous autoregressive parameters of eq. (4), firms will have heteroge-
neous responses to sigma shocks. In Figure 5, I show the median impulse response function
to orthogonalized sigma shocks between the 25% and the 75% IRF quantiles to assess the
heterogeneity in impulse responses across firms. In general, the IRF that concerns short-term
funding are more heterogenous (impact of other variables shocks on short-term debt and im-
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pact of short-term debt shocks on other variables). The range between impulse responses
quantiles is also wider for the interaction between SRISK and the short-term balance sheet.
For some banks, it takes three years for the impact of SRISK shocks on short-term funding
to vanish whereas the solvency shocks of other banks have a more definitive impact on their
short-term funding. Then, the impulse response functions well illustrate previous findings
on the asymmetric impact of shocks between SRISK and the short-term balance sheet, and
between the net income and the short-term debt.
The impact of orthogonalized sigma shocks will be different when I differentiate between
capital-constrained vs. adequately capitalized banks based on the parameters of eq. (5).
Figure 6 shows the gap in median impulse response functions between adequately capitalized
versus capital-constrained firms. The solvency-liquidity nexus appears to be exacerbated
for capital-constrained banks; the impact of solvency shocks on short-term funding doubles
compared to adequately capitalized banks, while the response of short-term debt to shocks in
other bank characteristics (net income and short-term assets) is less important and vanishes
more rapidly. For capital-constrained banks, only the solvency-liquidity nexus appears to
explain the short-term balance sheet.
3.3 Robustness of the solvency-liquidity nexus
3.3.1 Robustness to the TARP
On October 14, 2008, the U.S. government announced a series of measures — the Trou-
bled Asset Relief Program (TARP) — to restore financial stability. Under the TARP, the
Treasury Department launched the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) launched the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(TLGP). Treasury injected $205 billion capital into banks under the CPP by buying war-
rants, common shares, and preferred shares.15 Under the TLGP, the FDIC allowed financial
institutions to retain and raise funding by giving a guarantee on existing noninterest-bearing
transaction accounts and certain newly issued senior unsecured debt. Data on the amount
and maturity of total unsecured debt issued by banks and guaranteed by the FDIC are pub-
licly available.16 It is possible to derive the hypothetical amount of short-term debt a bank
would have had if it did not have benefited from government guarantees. The solvency-
liquidity nexus estimates hardly change when TLGP funding is not taken into account. It
15http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-
programs/cap/Pages/overview.aspx
16See http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/index.html
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is however impossible to project this scenario on the other variables of the panel VAR as it
requires knowing where TLGP funding was invested and how markets would have reacted
in this scenario.
If we assume that banks received help from the TARP because they actually needed it,
the amount of CCP capital injected and the amount of TLGP funding received are realized
measures of the bank’s capital shortfall and liquidity shortfall, respectively. The largest
banks received the largest injections of capital and liquidity. Looking at data from the
second quarter of 2008, I test different bank characteristics and risk measures to explain
their capital and liquidity shortfalls divided by their total assets. In Table 6, I report the
estimates of cross-sectional regressions for a sample of 17 banks that received both capital and
liquidity interventions. It appears that the regulatory capital ratios are the most important
factors explaining government interventions. After controlling for the size, we observe that
banks that received help from the CPP and banks that received help from the TLGP have
different profiles. Banks that received government secured debt had low Tier 1 leverage ratios
(ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets), whereas banks that received capital injections had
low Tier 1 Common capital ratios (ratio of Tier 1 common equity capital to risk-weighted
assets). Banks with high liquidity shortfalls in 2008Q4 had a large short-term balance sheet,
high cost of funding, and high market beta (or LRMES) in 2008Q2. Conversely, banks
with high capital shortfalls were more traditional banks with a large long-term balance sheet
(deposits and loans), high yields on earning assets, and low market beta (among the banks
that received government interventions).
3.3.2 Common factors
The short-term balance sheets of firms are expected to co-move according to the aggregate
liquidity conditions. To capture these common effects, I consider the macroeconomic and
financial factors that are used in Fontaine and Garcia (2012) to relate to their factor mea-
suring the value of funding liquidity. I test the robustness of the solvency-liquidity nexus to
these factors in the next section. The sensitivity of the short-term balance sheet (and its
covariates) to the common factors is tested in
wit = αi + φi  wit−1 + θit+ β′ft−1 + εit (7)
where wit = (yit, zit, NetIncomeit/TAit, SRISKit/TAit)′, and ft is a vector of common fac-
tors. Note that common factors do not necessarily need to be lagged but this allows for the
derivation of one-step ahead forecasts for wit without specifying a model for the common
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factors. The estimated parameters of common factors of eq. (7) are reported in Table 7.17
Interest rates are expected to play an important role on the short-term balance sheet.
Three factors related to interest rates are considered; the level of interest rates is captured
by the Fed funds rate, the difference between long-term and short-term rates is measured
by the slope factor of the Treasury yield curve, and the TED spread reflects the perceived
counterparty risk of interbank loans compared to Treasury loans. The TED spread is usually
referred as an aggregate funding liquidity risk factor (Cornett et al. (2011); Fontaine and
Garcia (2012)). In the sample considered, the TED spread is not significant to explain the
short-term balance sheet directly but has a negative impact on the profitability of banks and
a positive impact on their solvency risk (measured by SRISK).
The Treasury slope factor measures the difference between long-term and short-term
interest rates. A steeper term structure indicates higher profitability of investing short-term
funding in long-term assets (Fontaine and Garcia (2012)). This factor also reflects business
cycles and could be interpreted as a demand factor for liquidity. It is therefore not surprising
to find that short-term debt increases with a steeper slope of the Treasury yield curve.
The positive and significant coefficient of the Fed funds rate on short-term debt is more
surprising and possibly reflects an endogenous response of the Federal Reserve to funding
conditions during the financial crisis. Furthermore, Diamond and Rajan (2005) explain that
higher interest rates do not always lead to lower excess demand for liquidity because of the
effect of bank failures. Higher interest rates cause more banks to become insolvent and run
(because of decreasing assets value). The excess demand will increase with interest rates if
by failing, banks absorb more liquidity than when solvent. Through these two channels (Fed
interventions and firms failures), there is an endogenous feedback of aggregate liquidity and
solvency risks on the level of interest rates.
Mortgage growth (MTG) increases the demand for short-term debt. MTG is referred
in Fontaine and Garcia (2012) as a factor exclusively affecting the demand for liquidity
by increasing the pool of illiquid assets in the economy. Other considered factors include
flight-to-quality variables related to Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMF). The growth
in MMMF assets (MMG) increases the supply of funding to banks via the shadow banking
sector (Adrian and Shin (2009); Fontaine and Garcia (2012)), but short-term funding supply
decreases when MMMF assets are allocated to safer assets like time deposits (MMA1) or
17Data sources of common factors: Federal Reserve Board Selected Interest Rates - H.15 (Fed fund rate);
FRB Money Stock Measures - H.6 (M2 money supply growth); FRB Financial Accounts of the United States
- Z.1 (MMMF flows, mortgage growth); Department of the Treasury (Treasury yield curves); Bloomberg
(VIX).
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government-sponsored securities (MMA2).
The coefficient associated with MMA1 is negative and significant at the 1%. This result
could, however, simply reflect the increase of the FDIC deposit insurance limit in 2008Q4.
Acharya and Mora (2013) document the shift from time deposits and debt issued by banks
(and MMA1) to government-sponsored securities (and MMA2), and the “liquidity reversal”
in 2008Q4 where MMA1 started to increase again. When the FDIC deposit insurance limit
increased from 100K to 250K in the fourth quarter of 2008, uninsured deposits included
in the short-term debt shifted to the long-term part of the balance sheet. Therefore, the
negative impact of MMA1 on banks’ short-term debt is partly explained by the reallocation
in 2008Q4 of some previously uninsured time deposits (part of the short-term debt) to the
long-term debt within banks’ balance sheets.
We also note the positive coefficient of the VIX as banks’ exposure to short-term debt was
the highest when the VIX peaked during the financial crisis. Finally, short-term assets are
not sensitive to any of the considered factors. While the level of short-term assets adjusts
to shocks in other parts of the balance sheet, it is not directly affected by financial and
macroeconomic conditions.
3.3.3 Robustness of the solvency-liquidity nexus to common factors
I test the robustness of the solvency-liquidity nexus to the presence of common factors in
wit = αi + φi  wit−1 + θit+ λ′git−1 + β′ft−1 + εit (8)
where wit = (yit, zit, NetIncomeit/TAit, SRISKit/TAit)′, git is a ((2 ∗ K + 1) × 1) vector
stacking wit, wit ∗ sit and sit in a single column, λ is a ((2 ∗K + 1)× 1) vector containing the
δ, γ and ω parameters, and ft is the vector of macroeconomic and financial factors identified
in Section 3.3.2.
Chudik and Pesaran (2013) propose an alternative modeling strategy based on the Com-
mon Correlated Effects (CCE) of Pesaran (2006), where the unobserved common factors are
proxied by the cross-sectional averages of the dependent variable and the regressors
wit = αi + φi  wit−1 + θit+ λ′git−1 +
1∑
l=0
ϕ′lw¯t−l + κ
′g¯t−1 + εit (9)
where w¯t−l = N−1
∑N
i=1wit−l and g¯t = N
−1∑N
i=1 git.
The estimation results of eq. (8) and eq. (9) are reported in Table 8. The fit improves
considerably when common factors are included. The best in-sample performance is found
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with the CCE model for all elements of wit. However, the CCE model counts a contempora-
neous factor (average of the dependent variable), while the model with macro and financial
factors only includes lagged factors. The macro-financial model is therefore more convenient
for forecasting and the loss of in-sample fit is relatively small compared to the CCE model.
The solvency-liquidity nexus holds when I control for cross-sectional dependence. The
interaction term between the profitability and SRISK is however not as important (not
significant at the 5%). The impulse response functions do not qualitatively change either
when macroeconomic and financial factors are considered.
3.3.4 Short-term debt components and fixed effects
The different components of short-term debt (repos, uninsured deposits, commercial papers,
etc.) have very different characteristics and may not react to solvency risk with the same
magnitude. Table 12 (Appendix C) reports the parameter estimates of eq. (4) where the
dependent variable in each column is a different component (in logarithm) of the short-term
debt available from FR 9-YC reports. SRISK predicts most of the components of the
short-term debt; it is significant at the 1% level for wholesale funding (Fed funds, repos,
and commercial papers), and at the 5% level for retail funding (uninsured time deposits and
foreign office deposits).
Other robustness checks (not reported in this paper) show that the interaction between
solvency and liquidity remains with homogenous dynamic parameters (φi = φ, ∀i), homoge-
nous trend parameters (θi = θ, ∀i), without trend (θi = 0, ∀i), and when a break in 2008Q4
is included in the trend. These results tend to confirm the robustness of the solvency-
liquidity nexus. In the next section, I test for the out-of-sample forecasting performance of
the solvency-liquidity nexus in predicting the short-term balance sheet of banks.
4 Forecasting the short-term balance sheet
To test for the out-of-sample predictive performance of the solvency-liquidity nexus, I con-
duct two forecasting exercises. Both exercises are based on a fixed estimation period from
2000Q1 to 2010Q4 to forecast the balance sheet of banks over the four quarters of 2011. The
information is updated each quarter in the one-step ahead forecasts (wˆit+1|t), while there is
no information update in the dynamic forecasts (wˆit+h|t). The out-of-sample period corre-
sponds to the European sovereign debt crisis, funding conditions were not as tight as during
the financial crisis in the U.S. but the total decline of $161 billion in short-term funding of
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U.S. banks during this period indicate potential liquidity stress for some banks.
The root-mean square forecasting error (RMSFE) of the one-step ahead forecasting exer-
cise are reported in Table 9. In this Table, I report the RMSFE of the short-term debt and
short-term assets individually (Panel A and B), as well as the RMSFE of their difference
(Panel C). As already mentioned, the liquid asset shortfall is a measure of the exposure of
banks to funding liquidity risk; the wider the gap in the short-term balance sheet, the more
vulnerable the bank to runs. As this paper studies the liquidity-solvency nexus of banks,
I also report the RMSFE of this liquid asset shortfall for capital-constrained (Panel D) vs.
adequately capitalized banks (Panel E).
Four models are considered: a univariate autoregressive model (AR), the panel VAR
model of eq. (4) (VAR), the panel VAR model of eq. (5) that allows for the interaction of
bank characteristics with the state variable sit = 1{SRISKit>0} (INT), and the model including
all these features together with the macroeconomic and financial factors (eq. (8)) (CF).
The assumption on the trend appears to be the most important model characteristic to
impact forecasting errors. To check for the robustness of the forecasting results, I report the
RMSFE of these models for different trend assumptions (heterogeneous trends, homogenous
trend, no trend, and a break in the homogenous trend in 2008Q4).
For the one-step ahead forecasts, the best model is the panel VAR model that accounts
for the interaction of bank characteristics with SRISK (INT), and that assumes a break
in the trend in the fourth quarter of 2008. When the trend parameters are constant over
time, the model with common factors (CF) performs the best for the liquid asset shortfall as
common factors reflect the changing aggregate funding conditions after the financial crisis.
In the last three columns of Table 7, I report the increase in RMSFE when a particular bank
variable is not included in the panel VAR model. This Table shows that omitting SRISK
increases the forecasting errors of the liquid asset shortfall considerably, and particularly for
capital constrained banks during 2011. However, the panel VAR model or the interaction
with solvency risk (INT) does not improve the forecasts of adequately capitalized banks.
I obtain very similar results for the dynamic forecasts and therefore do not report their
RMSFE. Note that the RMSFE of dynamic forecasts are larger compared to the errors of
one-step ahead forecasts due to the absence of information updates over the forecasting
horizon. The model with interaction with SRISK (INT) and a break in the trend after
the financial crisis is also the preferred model according the RMSFE of dynamic forecasts.
The cross-sectional average dynamic forecasts obtained with this model for the short-term
balance sheet levels and flows over 2011Q1-2013Q1 are illustrated in Figure 7. It turns out
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that the model is outstanding at forecasting short-term financing flows but does a less good
job at forecasting short-term asset flows, which are not sensitive to the factors considered in
the model.
In Figure 8, I show the average dynamic forecasts of the liquid asset shortfall across all
banks, as well as for the subsamples of capital-constrained vs. adequately capitalized banks.
As mentioned in the introduction, the liquid asset shortfall of capital-constrained banks
spiked in the first quarters of 2007 and suddenly dropped afterwards due to the sudden
freeze of short-term funding markets. In the first quarter of 2011, the average liquid asset
shortfall of capital-constrained banks became negative; capital-constrained firms had less
exposure to funding liquidity risk than adequately capitalized banks for the first time over
the sample period. The model predicts this reversal in the solvency-liquidity nexus and
predicts well the average excess of liquidity of capital-constrained banks during this period.
5 Conclusion
This paper reveals the empirical solvency-liquidity nexus of banks. While the interaction
between solvency and liquidity has been well studied in the theoretical economic literature,
this relationship tends to be omitted in the new capital and liquidity regulatory standards
introduced under Basel III. In this paper, I test the solvency-liquidity nexus by examining
the short-term balance sheet and the solvency risk measures of a sample of U.S. bank holding
companies over 2000-2013.
I find that the expected capital shortfall of a bank in a crisis (SRISK) predicts how much
short-term funding the bank has access to. Conversely, when the bank holds more short-term
debt, its risk of insolvency in a crisis increases. This result appears to be strong under many
robustness checks and supports the theoretical models of the interaction between solvency
and liquidity risks and its amplification (aggregate) effects leading to systemic risk.
Importantly, not all solvency risk measures predict the bank’s access to short-term debt.
The expected capital shortfall SRISK interacts well with the level of short-term funding of
the bank compared to other solvency risk measures because (i) it is a measure of the bank’s
exposure to aggregate risk, and (ii) it combines both book and market values. Suppliers of
liquidity are mostly concerned with the vulnerability of the bank to an aggregate crisis due
to the high liquidation costs the distressed bank will face in the presence of fire sales. When
the crisis happens, ’pure’ solvency risk (measured by the Tier 1 leverage ratio) amplified by
market shocks explains the bank access to short-term funding.
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The expected capital shortfall of the bank under stress also interacts with its profitability
in determining its short-term balance sheet. While a profitable bank gets a larger access
to short-term funding and does not hold as much liquid assets, the impact of the bank’s
profitability on its liquidity profile tends to disappear when the bank is expected to be
insolvent in a crisis.
The solvency-liquidity nexus provides useful information for forecasting the short-term
financing flows during 2011 (European sovereign debt crisis). I show that the forecasting
errors of the liquid asset shortfall of banks increase considerably when the stressed solvency
risk measure is not included in the regression.
Overall, the results of this paper suggest that the solvency-liquidity nexus should be
accounted for when designing liquidity and capital regulations, where macroprudential regu-
lation of funding liquidity risk would be a combination of both liquid assets requirements and
capital requirements. This paper suggests that maintaining the capitalization of the banking
sector reduces systemic risk not only by addressing solvency risk problems of banks in a cri-
sis; it also attenuates the solvency-liquidity nexus that makes banks particularly vulnerable
to an aggregate crisis. Higher capital requirements for systemically important institutions
serve a dual purpose; they act as a loss absorbing buffer when banks’ asset values deterio-
rate, and by improving banks’ robustness to an aggregate crisis, they ensure the confidence
of creditors to continue to provide funding to the banks.
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Dep. variable: yit zit (SRISK/TA)it
(SRISK/TA)it−1 -1.120** 0.074
(0.244) (0.114)
zit−1 -0.040 -0.001
(0.023) (0.002)
yit−1 -0.003 0.009**
(0.022) (0.002)
R2 (%) 20.811 22.157 15.151
Adj. R2 (%) 15.430 16.868 9.429
Table 1: Testing the solvency-liquidity nexus. Estimates from pooled OLS regression
with bank dummies, time trends, and heterogeneous AR parameters. Dependent variables:
yit = ln(STDebtit), zit = ln(STAssetsit), (SRISK/TA)it = SRISKit/TotalAssetsit. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. * significant parameter at 5%; ** at 1%. Sample: 2107
panel obs. over 2000Q1-2013Q1 (unbalanced), 44 banks. SRISK is the expected capital
shortfall of the bank in a crisis.
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Dep. variable: dYit dZit yit zit (NI/TA)it (SRISK/TA)it
(SRISK/TA)it−1 -0.013 -0.039 -1.059** -0.038 -2.241**
(0.024) (0.038) (0.235) (0.118) (0.282)
(NI/TA)it−1 -0.870 0.290 2.313 -4.185 -1.211**
(0.592) (0.508) (2.232) (2.348) (0.386)
zit−1 -0.035** -0.006 -0.034 0.162 -0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.024) (0.162) (0.002)
yit−1 -0.0004 -0.018** -0.002 -0.023 0.008**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (0.021) (0.002)
dZit−1 0.101* 0.004 -0.110 -0.103 0.014
(0.046) (0.109) (0.116) (0.145) (0.012)
dY it−1 -0.104* -0.137 0.157 0.254 -0.002
(0.052) (0.199) (0.096) (0.224) (0.011)
R2 (%) 11.319 12.008 21.047 22.411 42.099 15.837
Adj. R2 (%) 5.197 5.934 15.554 17.013 38.099 10.024
Table 2: Testing the solvency-liquidity nexus: short-term vs. long-term balance
sheet. Estimates from pooled OLS regression with bank dummies, time trends and hetero-
geneous AR parameters. Dependent variables: dYit = ln(LTDebtit/LTDebtit−1), dZit =
ln(LTAssetsit/LTAssetsit−1), yit = ln(STDebtit), zit = ln(STAssetsit), (NI/TA)it =
NetIncomeit/TotalAssetsit, (SRISK/TA)it = SRISKit/TotalAssetsit. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * significant parameter at 5%; ** at 1%. Sample: 2107 panel obs.
over 2000Q1-2013Q1 (unbalanced), 44 banks. SRISK is the expected capital shortfall of the
bank in a crisis.
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Dep. variable: CPP/TA TLGP/TA
Cst 4.280 -7.478
(6.088) (8.948)
T1LVGR 0.222 -0.941*
(0.269) (0.395)
T1CR -0.285* 0.181
(0.106) (0.155)
log(TA) -0.042 0.806*
(0.240) (0.352)
R2 (%) 37.701 72.217
Adj. R2 (%) 23.325 65.805
Table 6: Testing factors explaining capital and liquidity injections under the
TARP. Estimates from cross-sectional OLS regressions. Dependent variables: the amount
of capital received under the CPP divided by total assets (CPP/TA), the amount of total
unsecured debt guaranteed by the FDIC (TLGP) divided by total assets (TLGP/TA). Both
CPP and TLGP programs were launched on October 14, 2008. T1LVGR: Tier 1 Leverage
ratio, T1CR: Tier 1 Common Capital Ratio, log(TA): logarithm of total assets, as of 2008Q2.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant parameter at 5%; ** at 1%. Sample: 17
banks.
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Dep. variable: yit zit (NI/TA)it (SRISK/TA)it
Fedfund ratet−1 0.045** 0.001 -0.031 -0.005
(0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.003)
Treasury slopet−1 0.077** 0.013 -0.055 0.006**
(0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.001)
TEDt−1 0.003 0.043 -0.172** 0.009*
(0.015) (0.024) (0.048) (0.004)
VIXt−1 0.003** 0.0004 -0.002 -0.00005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002)
M2Gt−1 -4.308** -0.366 0.255 0.154
(1.351) (1.035) (1.078) (0.171)
MTGt−1 3.760** -1.281 0.946 -0.748*
(1.120) (1.455) (1.236) (0.368)
MMGt−1 0.463** -0.308 -0.197 0.008
(0.172) (0.223) (0.336) (0.034)
MMA1t−1 -1.994** 1.058 -0.592 -0.300**
(0.455) (0.601) (0.628) (0.073)
MMA2t−1 0.265 -0.291 -1.510** -0.181*
(0.222) (0.383) (0.509) (0.086)
R2 (%) 21.996 23.816 44.559 19.217
Adj. R2 (%) 16.399 18.350 40.609 13.461
Table 7: Testing common factors. Estimates from pooled OLS regression with bank
dummies, time trends, heterogeneous AR parameters and common factors. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * significant parameter at 5%; ** at 1%. Sample: 2107 panel obs. over
2000Q1-2013Q1 (unbalanced), 44 banks. Treasury slope is the slope factor of the Treasury
yield curve. M2G: money supply growth (M2). MTG: mortgage assets growth. MMG:
MMMF assets growth. MMA1: proportion of MMMF assets allocated to time deposits.
MMA2: proportion of MMMF assets allocated to Treasury, agency, or municipal bonds.
32
N
o
C
om
m
on
Fa
ct
or
C
om
m
on
Fa
ct
or
s
C
om
m
on
C
or
re
la
te
d
E
ffe
ct
s
D
ep
.
va
ri
ab
le
:
y
it
z i
t
N
I/
T
A
SR
IS
K
/T
A
y
it
z i
t
N
I/
T
A
SR
IS
K
/T
A
y
it
z i
t
N
I/
T
A
SR
IS
K
/T
A
(S
R
IS
K
/T
A
) i
t−
1
-0
.9
35
**
-0
.1
20
-1
.6
81
**
-0
.8
47
**
-0
.1
78
-1
.4
17
**
-0
.9
00
**
-0
.1
37
-1
.6
49
**
(0
.2
61
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.3
18
)
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.1
17
)
(0
.2
80
)
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.0
93
)
(S
R
IS
K
/T
A
) i
t−
1
∗s
it
−
1
-0
.4
08
1.
75
7*
-5
.8
71
**
-0
.6
87
1.
29
1
-5
.1
08
**
-1
.4
13
2.
38
4*
-5
.2
50
**
(0
.7
51
)
(0
.7
67
)
(1
.7
67
)
(0
.8
53
)
(0
.8
61
)
(1
.7
36
)
(0
.9
74
)
(1
.0
09
)
(1
.9
76
)
(N
I/
T
A
) i
t−
1
9.
70
4*
*
-7
.9
44
*
-2
.8
09
**
8.
11
1*
-7
.5
64
*
-2
.6
39
*
8.
51
2*
-7
.9
64
*
-2
.2
05
**
(3
.2
90
)
(3
.7
16
)
(0
.9
35
)
(3
.6
77
)
(3
.5
75
)
(1
.0
26
)
(3
.5
42
)
(3
.9
05
)
(0
.7
71
)
(N
I/
T
A
) i
t−
1
∗s
it
−
1
-9
.9
02
*
6.
31
5
2.
13
4*
-8
.0
87
4.
81
7
2.
03
4*
-7
.1
81
7.
92
6
2.
10
5*
(4
.3
96
)
(5
.1
83
)
(0
.9
37
)
(4
.7
88
)
(4
.9
20
)
(0
.9
76
)
(4
.6
55
)
(5
.5
12
)
(0
.8
26
)
z
it
−
1
-0
.0
33
-0
.0
35
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
47
*
-0
.0
04
0.
00
04
-0
.0
45
-0
.0
04
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
03
)
z
it
−
1
∗s
it
−
1
-0
.0
21
*
0.
07
8*
-0
.0
00
8
-0
.0
18
*
0.
05
2*
0.
00
03
-0
.0
13
0.
04
7
0.
00
06
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
01
)
y
it
−
1
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
31
0.
00
8*
*
0.
00
2
0.
01
5
0.
00
9*
*
0.
00
4
0.
02
6
0.
00
8*
*
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
03
)
y
it
−
1
∗s
it
−
1
-0
.0
07
*
-0
.0
80
*
0.
00
2
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
51
*
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
46
*
-0
.0
03
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
02
)
s i
t−
1
0.
34
7*
0.
06
6
0.
09
4
-0
.0
18
0.
32
7*
0.
09
8
0.
03
4
0.
01
1
0.
25
3
0.
14
8
0.
01
4
0.
02
9
(0
.1
44
)
(0
.1
59
)
(0
.1
87
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.1
39
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.1
58
)
(0
.1
45
)
(0
.0
17
)
R
2
(%
)
21
.2
78
22
.5
62
44
.4
74
16
.1
84
25
.0
79
24
.2
47
48
.4
38
20
.6
65
26
.7
30
27
.2
65
50
.2
95
30
.9
90
A
dj
.
R
2
(%
)
15
.7
15
17
.0
89
40
.5
79
10
.3
04
19
.4
16
18
.5
21
44
.5
67
14
.7
09
21
.1
92
21
.7
67
46
.5
64
25
.8
09
Ta
bl
e
8:
R
ob
u
st
n
es
s
of
th
e
so
lv
en
cy
-l
iq
u
id
it
y
n
ex
u
s
to
co
m
m
on
fa
ct
or
s.
E
st
im
at
es
fr
om
po
ol
ed
O
LS
re
gr
es
-
si
on
w
it
h
ba
nk
du
m
m
ie
s,
ti
m
e
tr
en
ds
,
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ou
s
A
R
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
an
d
st
at
e
va
ri
ab
le
s i
t
=
1 {
S
R
I
S
K
it
>
0
}.
D
ep
en
-
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
s:
y i
t
=
ln
(S
T
D
eb
t i
t)
,
z i
t
=
ln
(S
T
A
ss
et
s i
t)
,
(N
I
/T
A
) i
t
=
N
et
I
n
co
m
e i
t/
T
ot
a
lA
ss
et
s i
t,
(S
R
I
S
K
/T
A
) i
t
=
S
R
I
S
K
it
/T
ot
a
lA
ss
et
s i
t.
N
o
C
om
m
on
Fa
ct
or
:
re
gr
es
si
on
w
it
ho
ut
co
m
m
on
fa
ct
or
s
(e
q.
(5
))
.
C
om
m
on
Fa
ct
or
s:
re
gr
es
si
on
w
it
h
al
l(
la
gg
ed
)
co
m
m
on
fa
ct
or
s
of
Ta
bl
e
7
(e
q.
(8
))
.
C
om
m
on
C
or
re
la
te
d
E
ffe
ct
s:
re
gr
es
si
on
w
it
h
co
m
m
on
co
rr
el
at
ed
eff
ec
ts
(e
q.
(9
))
.
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
pa
ra
m
et
er
at
5%
;
**
at
1%
.
Sa
m
pl
e:
21
07
pa
ne
l
ob
s.
ov
er
20
00
Q
1-
20
13
Q
1
(u
nb
al
an
ce
d)
,4
4
ba
nk
s.
SR
IS
K
is
th
e
ex
pe
ct
ed
ca
pi
ta
ls
ho
rt
fa
ll
of
th
e
ba
nk
in
a
cr
is
is
.
33
P
A
N
E
L
A
:
Fo
re
ca
st
in
g
th
e
sh
or
t-
te
rm
d
eb
t
T
re
nd
as
su
m
pt
io
n
A
R
V
A
R
IN
T
C
F
4
R
M
SF
E
(S
R
IS
K
)
4
R
M
SF
E
(N
I)
4
R
M
SF
E
(S
T
A
)
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ou
s
tr
en
ds
18
56
7
16
33
8
16
26
7
11
93
9
18
71
-2
36
45
1
ho
m
og
en
ou
s
tr
en
d
10
23
9
10
57
7
79
43
10
75
3
81
3
-5
19
-1
98
no
tr
en
d
84
38
79
43
68
01
90
46
11
65
-1
85
-7
8
tr
en
d
br
ea
k
10
03
8
82
95
75
81
12
98
6
12
52
-4
3
-1
48
P
A
N
E
L
B
:
Fo
re
ca
st
in
g
th
e
sh
or
t-
te
rm
as
se
ts
T
re
nd
as
su
m
pt
io
n
A
R
V
A
R
IN
T
C
F
4
R
M
SF
E
(S
R
IS
K
)
4
R
M
SF
E
(N
I)
4
R
M
SF
E
(S
T
A
)
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ou
s
tr
en
ds
13
07
9
13
81
7
13
59
6
15
01
1
-1
13
84
-8
02
ho
m
og
en
ou
s
tr
en
d
13
47
7
13
82
8
13
57
0
14
38
1
45
-1
27
-2
28
no
tr
en
d
14
63
2
15
34
9
14
48
3
14
17
6
37
0
-1
92
-6
51
tr
en
d
br
ea
k
13
23
5
13
10
8
12
98
8
13
98
5
-6
0
-1
01
26
4
P
A
N
E
L
C
:
Fo
re
ca
st
in
g
th
e
li
qu
id
as
se
t
sh
or
tf
al
l
(w
h
ol
e
sa
m
p
le
)
T
re
nd
as
su
m
pt
io
n
A
R
V
A
R
IN
T
C
F
4
R
M
SF
E
(S
R
IS
K
)
4
R
M
SF
E
(N
I)
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ou
s
tr
en
ds
19
83
4
17
37
4
15
67
3
13
42
6
16
38
-3
01
ho
m
og
en
ou
s
tr
en
d
15
73
7
18
47
5
16
89
1
15
24
4
37
0
-7
91
no
tr
en
d
15
99
9
17
17
2
15
95
2
14
91
5
16
29
-5
76
tr
en
d
br
ea
k
14
35
3
14
15
9
13
99
3
15
78
2
22
5
-3
21
P
A
N
E
L
D
:
Fo
re
ca
st
in
g
th
e
li
qu
id
as
se
t
sh
or
tf
al
l
of
ad
eq
u
at
el
y
ca
p
it
al
iz
ed
b
an
ks
(S
R
I
S
K
it
≤
0
)
T
re
nd
as
su
m
pt
io
n
A
R
V
A
R
IN
T
C
F
4
R
M
SF
E
(S
R
IS
K
)
4
R
M
SF
E
(N
I)
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ou
s
tr
en
ds
77
02
64
43
69
92
49
27
87
-2
7
ho
m
og
en
ou
s
tr
en
d
52
94
60
03
66
72
53
38
-1
85
-8
4
no
tr
en
d
52
97
61
17
66
66
57
25
-5
8
-5
4
tr
en
d
br
ea
k
44
31
53
74
56
54
50
81
-2
36
-4
9
P
A
N
E
L
E
:
Fo
re
ca
st
in
g
th
e
li
qu
id
as
se
t
sh
or
tf
al
l
of
ca
p
it
al
-c
on
st
ra
in
ed
b
an
ks
(S
R
I
S
K
it
>
0
)
T
re
nd
as
su
m
pt
io
n
A
R
V
A
R
IN
T
C
F
4
R
M
SF
E
(S
R
IS
K
)
4
R
M
SF
E
(N
I)
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ou
s
tr
en
ds
25
41
3
22
32
9
19
85
8
17
26
7
22
14
-4
06
ho
m
og
en
ou
s
tr
en
d
20
33
7
23
91
6
21
61
5
19
65
8
53
6
-1
05
7
no
tr
en
d
20
69
2
22
12
2
20
32
6
19
12
5
22
26
-7
74
tr
en
d
br
ea
k
18
62
4
18
17
0
17
87
7
20
43
9
35
8
-4
29
Ta
bl
e
9:
Fo
re
ca
st
in
g
th
e
sh
or
t-
te
rm
b
al
an
ce
sh
ee
t.
R
oo
t
M
ea
n
Sq
ua
re
Fo
re
ca
st
in
g
E
rr
or
(R
M
SF
E
):
on
e-
st
ep
ah
ea
d
fo
re
ca
st
in
g
ov
er
20
11
.
F
ix
ed
es
ti
m
at
io
n
sa
m
pl
e
(2
00
0-
20
10
),
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
up
da
te
d
ea
ch
qu
ar
te
r.
A
R
:
un
iv
ar
ia
te
au
to
re
gr
es
si
ve
m
od
el
.
VA
R
:
pa
ne
l
VA
R
m
od
el
(e
q.
(4
))
.
IN
T
:
pa
ne
l
VA
R
w
it
h
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
w
it
h
SR
IS
K
(e
q.
(5
))
.
C
F
:
pa
ne
lV
A
R
w
it
h
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
w
it
h
SR
IS
K
an
d
co
m
m
on
fa
ct
or
s
(e
q.
(8
))
.
4
R
M
SE
(x
)
is
th
e
in
cr
ea
se
in
R
M
SE
w
he
n
va
ri
ab
le
x
is
no
t
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
VA
R
m
od
el
.
Li
qu
id
as
se
t
sh
or
tf
al
l
=
ST
D
eb
t
-
ST
A
ss
et
s.
In
bo
ld
:
m
in
im
um
R
M
SF
E
fo
r
ea
ch
lin
e
(t
re
nd
as
su
m
pt
io
n)
.
34
STAssets STDebt STAssets
STDebt
LTAssets LTDebt
LTAssets LTDebt
Equity
Equity
Bank is balance-sheet insolvent.
Assets are liquidated at a loss, only senior creditors are repaid.
STDebt
LTAssets
LTDebt
Figure 1: Simplified balance sheet. Liquid asset shortfallit = STDebtit−STAssetsit. Capital
shortfallit = k ∗ (STAssetsit +LTAssetsit)−Equityit. Expected capital shortfall in a crisis
SRISKit = E [k ∗ (STAssetsit+h + LTAssetsit+h)− Equityit+h|crisist+h] = k∗(LTDebtit+
STDebtit) − (1 − k) ∗ Equityit ∗ (1 + E(Rit+h|crisist+h)), where k is the prudential capital
ratio (8%).
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Figure 2: Cross-sectional average of the liquid asset shortfall of capital-constrained banks
(black line) vs. cross-sectional average of the liquid asset shortfall of adequately capitalized
banks (dashed line). Liquid asset shortfall = Short-term debt - Short-term assets ($m).
“Adequately capitalized” means SRISKit ≤ 0.
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Figure 3: Cross-sectional averages of the balance sheet (in $m): short-term debt and
short-term assets (top-left panel), difference between short-term debt and short-term assets
(top-right panel), total assets and long-term balance sheet (bottom-left panel), net income
(bottom-right panel).
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Figure 4: Cross-sectional averages of solvency risk measures. T1CR is the Tier 1 common
capital ratio (Tier 1 common capital divided by risk-weighted assets); T1LVGR is the Tier 1
leverage ratio (Tier 1 capital divided by total assets); SRISK is the expected capital shortfall
in a crisis.
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions. Median impulse response function (black lines) be-
tween the 25% and 75% impulse response quantiles (dotted lines).
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions with SRISK as a state variable (eq. (5)). Median
impulse response function when SRISKit ≤ 0 (black line) and median impulse response
function when SRISKit > 0 (dashed line).
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Figure 7: Forecasting the short-term balance sheet over 2011Q1-2013Q1: dynamic forecasts
(panel VAR with SRISK as a state variable (eq. (5)), break in trend).
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Figure 8: Forecasting the Liquid Asset Shortfall over 2011Q1-2013Q1: dynamic forecasts
(panel VAR with SRISK as a state variable (eq. (5)), break in trend).
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Appendix
A Short-term debt and short-term assets composition
Composition of the short term debt estimate (SNL definitions):
• Fed funds purchased: The gross dollar amount of funds borrowed in the form of imme-
diately available funds under agreements or contracts that mature in one business day
or roll over under a continuing contract, regardless of the nature of the transaction or
the collateral involved. Includes securities sold under agreements to repurchase that
involve the receipt of immediately available funds and mature in one business day or
roll over under a continuing contract.
• Repurchase agreements: The gross dollar amount of security repurchase agreements
that mature in more than one business day, other than securities sold under repurchase
agreements to maturity, but including sales of participations in pools of securities that
mature in more than one business day.
• Brokered Deposits (< $100K, maturity ≤ 1 Year): Brokered deposits issued in de-
nominations of less than $100,000 with a remaining maturity of one year or less and
are held in domestic offices of commercial banks or other depository institutions that
are subsidiaries of the reporting bank holding company. Remaining maturity is the
amount of time remaining from the report date until the final contractual maturity of
a brokered deposit.
• Time Deposits (≥ $100K, maturity≤ 1Year): Time deposits issued in denominations of
$100,000 or more with a remaining maturity of one year or less. Remaining maturity is
the amount of time remaining from the report date until the final contractual maturity
of a time deposit.
• Foreign Office Time Deposits (maturity ≤ 1Year): All time deposits in foreign offices
with remaining maturities of one year or less. Remaining maturity is the amount of
time remaining from the report date until the final contractual maturity of a time
deposit.
• Commercial Paper: The total amount outstanding of commercial paper issued by the
reporting bank holding company or its subsidiaries.
• Other borrowed money: The total amount of money borrowed by the consolidated
bank holding company with a remaining maturity of one year or less. For purposes of
this item, remaining maturity is the amount of time remaining from the report date
until the final contractual maturity of a borrowing without regard to the borrowing’s
repayment schedule, if any. Includes the dollar amount outstanding of all interest-
bearing demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury by the depository institutions that
are consolidated subsidiaries of the reporting bank holding company. Also includes
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mortgage indebtedness and obligations under capitalized leases with a remaining ma-
turity of one year or less. Also includes the total amount of money borrowed with a
remaining maturity of one year or less: (1) on its promissory notes; (2) on notes and
bills rediscounted; (3) on loans sold under repurchase agreements that mature in more
than one business day; (4) by the creation of due bills representing the bank holding
company’s receipt of payment and similar instruments, whether collateralized or un-
collateralized; (5) from Federal Reserve Banks; (6) by overdrawing ’due from’ balances
with depository institutions, except overdrafts arising in connection with checks or
drafts drawn by subsidiary depository institutions of the reporting bank holding com-
pany and drawn on, or payable at or through, another depository institution either on
a zero-balance account or on an account that is not routinely maintained with suffi-
cient balances to cover checks or drafts drawn in the normal course of business during
the period until the amount of the checks or drafts is remitted to the other depository
institution; (7) on purchases of so-called ’term federal funds’; and (8) on any other
obligation for the purpose of borrowing money that has a remaining maturity of one
year or less and that is not reported elsewhere.
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Figure 9: Short term debt composition ($m) - 44 BHCs
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Composition of the short term assets estimate (SNL definitions):
• Cash & Non interest-bearing Deposits: The total of all noninterest-bearing balances
due from depository institutions, currency and coin, cash items in process of collection,
and unposted debits. Includes balances due from banks in the U.S., banks in foreign
countries and foreign central banks, foreign branches of other U.S. banks, Federal Home
Loan Banks, and Federal Reserve Banks.
• Total Interest-bearing Balances: The total of all interest-bearing balances due from
depository institutions and foreign central banks that are held in offices of the bank
holding company or its consolidated subsidiaries.
• Fed Funds Sold: The gross dollar amount of funds lent in the form of immediately
available funds under agreements or contracts that mature in one business day or roll
over under a continuing contract. Includes securities purchased under agreements to
resell that involve the receipt of immediately available funds and mature in one business
day or roll over under a continuing contract.
• Reverse Repurchases Agreements: The gross dollar amount of security resale agree-
ments that mature in more than one business day, other than securities purchased
under resale agreements to maturity, and of purchases of participations in pools of
securities that mature in more than one business day.
• Debt Securities Maturing or Repriced (maturity ≤ 1Year): All securities held by the
consolidated bank holding company with a remaining maturity or amount of time
remaining until next repricing date of one year or less. Held-to-maturity securities
are reported at amortized cost and available-for-sale securities are reported at fair
value. Remaining maturity is the amount of time remaining from the report date until
the final contractual maturity of the instrument without regard to the instrument’s
repayment schedule. Next repricing date is the date the interest rate on a floating rate
debt security can next change. (Y9 Line Item: BHCK0383)
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2. a. Debt securities: Maturity/Repricing <= 1Yr  a. Cash & noninterest bearing balances
 b. Total interest bearing balances 3. Tot fed funds & reverse repos
Figure 10: Short-term assets composition ($m) - 44 BHCs
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B Stationarity of balance sheet aggregates
To test for the stationarity of yit, zit and other balance sheet quantities, I apply the unit root
test of Pesaran (2007) (CIPS) robust to cross-sectional dependence between individuals in
the panel data set. The the null hypothesis is H0 : α21 = α22 = ... = α2N = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., N
(unit root), and the alternative Ha : α21 < 0, ..., α2N0 < 0, N0 ≤ N(a significant fraction of
the panel is stationary). The regression for the CIPS unit root test is
dyit = α0i + α1idyit−1 + α2iyit−1 + aidy¯t + biy¯t−1 + cidy¯t−1 + θit+ εit, (10)
where dy¯t = N−1
∑N
i=1 dyit, y¯t = N
−1∑N
i=1 yit. The CIPS test statistics are reported in Table
10 for both cases with and without trend (i.e. θi = 0, ∀i). Based on the CIPS statistics and
given the critical values of the CADF distribution, yit is stationary only when the regression
includes a trend. The hypothesis of the absence of a trend is rejected based on a Wald test,
therefore yit is considered stationary in the rest of the paper.
On the other bank sheet aggregates, the UR hypothesis is not rejected for the size (loga-
rithm of total assets) and the long-term balance sheet (logarithm of long-term assets Zit and
long-term debt Yit). Finally, the short-term assets, SRISK and the net income divided by
total assets are stationary with this test.
Intercept only Intercept and trend
CIPS CIPSb CIPS CIPSb
yit -2.064 -1.922 -2.725 -2.660
zit -2.538 -2.545 -2.798 -2.849
NIit/TAit -3.541 -3.831 -4.101 -4.381
Yit -2.071 -2.199 -2.274 -2.468
Zit -1.954 -2.098 -2.449 -2.584
log(TAit) -1.709 -1.932 -2.163 -2.336
SRISKit/TAit -2.579 -2.434 -2.951 -2.989
Table 10: Panel UR tests: CIPS statistics. CADF 5% critical values: -2.11 (intercept only),
-2.60 (intercept and trend). CIPSb is the CIPS statistic based on a balanced panel dataset.
yit = ln(STDebtit), zit = ln(STAssetsit), Yit = ln(LTDebtit), Zit = ln(LTAssetsit), NIit:
net income, TAit: total assets.
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C Robustness checks
C.1 Period dummies
Dep. variable: yit zit (NI/TA)it (SRISK/TA)it yit zit (NI/TA)it (SRISK/TA)it
(SRISK/TA)it−1 -1.063** -0.028 -2.225** -0.623 -0.108 -2.033**
(0.245) (0.118) (0.301) (0.357) (0.178) (0.217)
(SRISK/TA)it−1 ∗ ct -0.606** 0.188 -0.321
(0.231) (0.167) (0.182)
(SRISK/TA)it−1 ∗ pct -0.091 -0.298 0.137
(0.383) (0.262) (0.194)
(NI/TA)it−1 2.354 -4.228 -1.217** 25.036** -7.046 -7.529**
(2.278) (2.331) (0.389) (7.838) (5.344) (2.011)
(NI/TA)it−1 ∗ ct -24.850** 5.882 6.355**
(8.248) (6.315) (1.576)
(NI/TA)it−1 ∗ pct -20.939 -8.164 9.165**
(12.332) (7.475) (2.463)
zit−1 -0.038 -0.015 -0.002 -0.012 -0.033 0.001
(0.023) (0.020) (0.002) (0.024) (0.024) (0.002)
zit−1 ∗ ct -0.003 0.018 -0.006**
(0.011) (0.033) (0.002)
zit−1 ∗ pct -0.008 0.003 -0.001
(0.020) (0.030) (0.003)
yit−1 -0.004 -0.067** 0.008** 0.002 0.015 0.008*
(0.021) (0.026) (0.002) (0.023) (0.017) (0.003)
yit−1 ∗ ct 0.011 -0.048 0.007*
(0.014) (0.034) (0.003)
yit−1 ∗ pct 0.009 -0.059* 0.00001
(0.022) (0.029) (0.004)
ct 0.114 -0.151 0.360 -0.017
(0.168) (0.241) (0.227) (0.028)
pct 0.023 -0.042 0.904** 0.005
(0.296) (0.383) (0.237) (0.034)
R2 (%) 20.870 22.318 41.925 15.787 24.877 22.956 44.361 25.551
Adj. R2 (%) 15.450 16.997 37.977 10.062 19.405 17.343 40.336 20.165
Table 11: Estimates from pooled OLS regression with bank dummies, time trends and het-
erogeneous AR parameters. Dependent variables: yit = ln(STDebtit), zit = ln(STAssetsit),
(NI/TA)it = NetIncomeit/TotalAssetsit, (SRISK/TA)it = SRISKit/TotalAssetsit. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. * significant parameter at 5%; ** at 1%. Sample: 2107
panel obs. over 2000Q1-2013Q1 (unbalanced), 44 banks. SRISK is the expected capital
shortfall of the bank in a crisis.
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C.2 Short-term debt components
Dep. variable: yit FFRepo Br Dep Time Dep For Dep ComPaper OtherBor
(SRISK/TA)it−1 -1.063** -1.217** 0.147 -0.363* -1.155* -2.330** -0.281
(0.245) (0.403) (0.518) (0.175) (0.531) (0.364) (0.377)
(NI/TA)it−1 2.354 0.152 -11.694 -1.660 10.880 17.540 3.249
(2.278) (2.437) (8.376) (4.733) (6.282) (10.392) (9.375)
zit−1 -0.038 0.015 -0.028 -0.046* -0.191* -0.091 -0.233**
(0.023) (0.051) (0.096) (0.019) (0.093) (0.083) (0.079)
# obs. 2107 1979 950 2096 1337 966 2035
# banks 44 44 40 44 34 27 44
R2 (%) 20.870 19.723 23.649 34.947 38.600 25.330 22.656
Adj. R2 (%) 15.450 13.843 12.279 30.459 33.355 18.187 17.152
Table 12: Estimates from pooled OLS regression with bank dummies, time trends and het-
erogeneous AR parameters. Dependent variables: log of the different components of the
short term debt (see definitions in Appendix A): Fed funds and Repos (FFRepo), Brokered
Deposits (Br Dep), uninsured Time Deposits (Time Dep), Foreign Deposits (For Dep), Com-
mercial Papers (ComPaper) and Other Borrowed Money (OtherBor). Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant parameter at 5%; ** at
1%. Sample: 2107 panel obs. over 2000Q1-2013Q1 (unbalanced), 44 banks. SRISK is the
expected capital shortfall of the bank in a crisis.
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D Sample of banks
Name Ticker SNL ID RSSD ID Industry Market Cap
American Express Company AXP 102700 1275216 Specialty Lender 60,834
Bank of America Corporation BAC 100369 1073757 Bank 183,125
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation BK 100144 3587146 Bank 55,522
BB&T Corporation BBT 100438 1074156 Bank 16,852
Capital One Financial Corp. COF 103239 2277860 Bank 18,215
Citigroup, Inc. C 4041896 1951350 Bank 146,644
Fifth Third Bancorp FITB 100260 1070345 Bank 13,386
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. GS 4039450 2380443 Broker Dealer 85,520
JPMorgan Chase & Co. JPM 100201 1039502 Bank 146,622
KeyCorp KEY 100334 1068025 Bank 9,117
MetLife, Inc. MET 4051708 2945824 Insurance 45,636
Morgan Stanley MS 103042 2162966 Broker Dealer 56,362
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. PNC 100406 1069778 Bank 22,355
Regions Financial Corporation RF 100233 3242838 Bank 16,439
State Street Corporation STT 100447 1111435 Bank 31,360
SunTrust Banks, Inc. STI 100449 1131787 Bank 21,756
U.S. Bancorp USB 4047176 1119794 Bank 54,804
Wells Fargo & Company WFC 100382 1120754 Bank 101,269
Franklin Resources Inc. BEN 102719 1246216 Asset Manager 28,037
Commerce Bancshares, Inc. CBSH 100184 2815235 Bank 3,229
CIT Group Inc. CIT 102820 1036967 Specialty Lender NA
Comerica Incorporated CMA 100206 1029259 Bank 6,574
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated HBAN 100307 1068191 Bank 5,401
Marshall & Ilsley MI 100364 3594612 Bank 7,086
M&T Bank Corporation MTB 100253 1037003 Bank 8,708
National City Corp. NCC 100378 1069125 Bank 10,433
Northern Trust Corporation NTRS 100386 1199611 Bank 16,843
New York Community Bancorp Inc. NYCB 1024119 2132932 Savings/Thrift/Mutual 5,689
The Charles Schwab Corporation SCHW 102775 1026632 Broker Dealer 29,547
Synovus Financial Corporation SNV 100440 1078846 Bank 7,943
UnionBanCal Corporation UB 1022285 1378434 Bank 6,776
Wachovia Bank WB 100293 1073551 Bank 75,122
Zions Bancorp. ZION 100501 1027004 Bank 4,995
Associated Banc-Corp ASBC 100135 1199563 Bank 3,442
Bank of Hawaii Corporation BOH 100161 1025309 Bank 2,506
BOK Financial Corporation BOKF 100003 1883693 Bank 3,471
Popular, Inc. BPOP 100165 2138466 Bank 2,971
Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc. CFR 100196 1102367 Bank 2,963
Table 13: Sample 1/2. Market capitalization in $m (Dec 30, 2007).
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Name Ticker SNL ID RSSD ID Industry Market Cap
City National Corporation CYN 100225 1131004 Bank 2,866
Discover Financial Services DFS 4096334 3846375 Specialty Lender NA
East West Bancorp, Inc. EWBC 4040606 2734233 Bank 1,527
First Citizens BancShares, Inc. FCNCA 100247 1105470 Bank 1,619
First Horizon National Corporation FHN 100292 1094640 Bank 2,294
Fulton Financial Corporation FULT 100294 1117129 Bank 1,946
Hancock Holding Company HBHC 100308 1086533 Bank 1,207
Prosperity Bancshares, Inc. PB 1018962 1109599 Bank 1,297
SVB Financial Group SIVB 100433 1031449 Bank 1,673
TCF Financial Corporation TCB 102002 2389941 Bank 2,272
Webster Financial Corporation WBS 102030 1145476 Bank 1,710
Table 14: Sample 2/2. Market capitalization in $m (Dec 30, 2007).
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